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Social theorists have long predicted the demise of religion. However, recent demographic projections show that the world is becoming more religious, not less. The contemporary resilience of religion is due in part to differences in family size: on the whole, religious individuals tend to have more children than their secular counterparts, and highly religious individuals have more children than less religious individuals. The high fertility of religious communities is puzzling because high fertility usually comes at a high cost to children. Cross cultural studies find that children born to large families face greater mortality risks, exhibit lower socio-economic success in adulthood, and score lower in cognitive functioning. This is because children born to large families suffer from lower levels of parental investment: each additional child draws more parental resources. Religious communities, however, appear to resist these trends. Children born to religious families do not exhibit reduced health nor psychosocial functioning. This paradox of religious fertility remains unexplained. Resolving the paradox requires information about how religious communities mitigate the costs of high fertility. I propose the Alloparenting Signaling Model which contends that religious based cooperation extends to cooperative childcare among networks of kin and unrelated co religionists, and that cooperative childcare in religious communities can offset the costs of high fertility. In an analysis of data drawn from diverse