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In this paper, I defend Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, from Blake Roeber's use of the inscrutability argument. Roeber argues that because God is inscrutable, we have no way of knowing whether or not God created our cognitive faculties with a reliable capacity for knowledge. (Sosa 2015)

Referring to what I refer to as the "genetic criticism" of religious beliefs which says that religious belief is little more than successful social or evolutionary adaptation in believing agents, I argue that a successful reply to this criticism shows that there are two modes of religious belief. I further argue that these may be distinguished at least in part, by the motivation of the believing agent. Each mode has distinct implications for the reliability of human faculties and whether the reliability as such is necessitated by the design of that organism. I conclude by arguing that Roeber's inscrutability argument is only successful with respect to one mode but not the other.